In November last year, against the background of French President Macron's visit to Kazakhstan, the WSJ published an article, the title of which speaks for itself, “War in Ukraine Loosens Russia’s Grip on Its Own Backyard”. By Russia's “Own Backyard”, its author, Yaroslav Trofimov, referred to Central Asia, especially Kazakhstan. Quite a lot of time has gone by since then, but the idea of Russia continuing to slip backward in the fight to retain its influence in the Central Asian region seems to be persisting among political experts and journalists focusing on relations between Moscow and Beijing. Rather demonstrative, in this sense, is the way how the recent SCO summit in Astana was covered by much of the media.
The WSJ’s Sha Hua, in a piece entitled “Beijing and Moscow Go From ‘No Limits’ Friendship to Frenemies in Russia’s Backyard”, comes to the following conclusion: “Central Asia moves further into China’s orbit as Ukraine war loosens Russia’s grip on former Soviet republics”.
The NYT's Keith Bradsher and Anatoly Kurmanaev, in an article entitled “How China and Russia Compete, and Cooperate, in Central Asia”, say: “In broader terms, however, Russia’s participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is largely a rear-guard action to counterbalance the region’s seemingly inexorable shift toward China. Mr. Putin relies heavily on China to keep his economy and military production afloat amid Western sanctions, and over the years his government has come to accept Beijing’s growing ties to Central Asia’s former Soviet Republics. The massive gap between Russia’s and Beijing’s economic muscle makes direct competition in Central Asia futile for the Kremlin”.
The SCMP's Zhao Ziwen, in an analytical piece entitled “Can China and Russia put aside Central Asian rivalry for SCO aims to counter West?”, quotes Zeno Leoni, a lecturer in the defense studies department of King’s College London, as saying: “China’s overwhelming might [could] undermine Russia’s plans for a Eurasian Economic Union (EEU)”. It also states: “The concerns include China’s growing economic dominance in Central Asia, Moscow’s traditional sphere of influence, as Western economic sanctions on Russia over the Ukraine war prompt a reality check among the ex-Soviet states”.
In a recent interview with a Radio France Internationale reporter (“Au sommet de l'OCS, “il y a une forme de partage d’intérêts entre la Russie et la Chine en Asie centrale”), Bayram Balci, a researcher at the Sciences Po Centre for International Studies, and an expert on Turkey and Central Asia, while answering the question, “How can major groups participate and play a key role at national and regional levels?”, said: “There is a form of sharing of interests between China and Russia in Central Asia. That is to say, Russia continues to prioritize everything related to security, military, defense, and also a little to the energy sector. For the rest, it cannot compete with China in terms of trade and the economy. The feeling is that Beijing takes care of the economy and Moscow takes care of defense… There is a sharing of interests for the moment, but, in the long term, Russia may end up being a loser”.
The trends are obvious though in Russia, it is not customary to focus attention on them in public. But this does not mean, needless to say, that Moscow accepts this development as inevitable and hasn't been and isn't taking measures to avoid such an ending where Russians would have found themselves being completely ousted from Central Asia. Judging by their speeches in the media, many well-known Russian politicians, media experts, and political observers fret about this subject. But they behave in cautious and reserved ways when considering it. That is because there appears to be a task of the Russian side wishing not to irritate China and cause additional fears in Central Asia until it is time for it. It must be why much of what has been done and is being done by Russia in this regard remains out of the public eye.
Against such background, it's no wonder that the attention of world media, politicians, and political experts remains riveted on that scenario of developments, in which ‘Russia may end up being a [total] loser’ in the geopolitical struggle for Central Asia.
However, as the Kazakh saying goes, “Even if you cut a snake into thirds, it would still have the strength comparable to that of a lizard”. Of course, Russia is not what it once was, but it is still a great power, one of the two largest nuclear-weapon States. Central Asia is the only post-Soviet region, where its influence remains significant. One thing is for certain: Russia isn't poised to withdraw from Central Asia once and for all and close off from its Central Asian neighbors. The decisive reason for that does not lie just in wanting to retain its presence there but also in the absence of the possibility for Russia to [physically] separate itself from Central Asia, as it is not severed from this region by obvious topographical barriers. So say the Russian geopolitical strategists. And maybe they are right. Timofei Bordachev, a Doctor of Political Science, Program director of the Valdai Discussion Club, in an analytical piece, entitled “Should we isolate ourselves from Central Asia?”, and published by russiancouncil.ru, says: “The border between us and friendly Kazakhstan extends for 7,598 km… Building an impenetrable wall along it seems to be technically impossible, and politically the best gift to our opponents in the West [The USA and its allies] and friends in the East [China]”.
From this, it is clear that Russians, when looking at their competitors in the struggle for influence in Central Asia, don't see much difference between the Westerners (the USA and its allies] and the Easterners (China). And, as can be seen, they are nowhere near ready to cede the Central Asian region to the former or the latter. According to the Russian geo-strategists, maintaining Russia's undeniable influence over, at least, Kazakhstan is a matter of life and death for the strategic security of their country. Since building an impenetrable wall along the Russian-Kazakh border ‘seems to be technically impossible’; and the fall of the Central Asian nation to the influence of other global powers, or international forces, had this happened, would be like a gut punch to the Russian Federation.
But even if that is the case, one should not turn a blind eye to the fact that the Russians have now found themselves in such a difficult situation because of a miscalculation made by their politicians and decision-makers in the past. Here is what Jakub Korejba, a Polish political scientist, said about this back in December 2012 (“A blow to Russia's soft underbelly”): “Russia hoped for the revival of the USSR and did not strengthen its border with Kazakhstan, expecting that it would again acquire a formal character. As a result, it now has to invest in ensuring the security of its southern neighbors. Moreover… the rules of the game have changed in the region. Central Asia has become an important object of policy for several competing powers… From Moscow's perspective, the US military's withdrawal from Afghanistan marks the beginning of a difficult and unpredictable period. As was the case in the history of the USSR, a blow to the soft underbelly can act as a trigger for both external and internal shocks, which would not be easy to cope with. Taking into account the weakness of state structures and strong social inequality in the Central Asian republics, as well as the activity of competing powers, this blow could threaten Russia with tragic consequences”.
If the situation has changed since then, i.e. in the last almost 12 years, only for the worse for Moscow. Proof of this are statements like ‘Russia may end up being a loser’ in Central Asia that we hear at the moment. This isn't to say that Russian political thought and strategists had not foreseen the risk of such developments in the Central Asian region, including Kazakhstan beforehand.
Another thing is that in a fast-changing world, they had and have to make adjustments to their strategic vision of the development of the situation in the post-Soviet space, in Central Asia, and around it. During the Yeltsin era and the earlier period of Putin's rule, Russia was constantly declaring itself, through its leaders, as belonging to Europe that “is now stretched from Lisbon to Vladivostok” and to “a common security space from Vancouver to Vladivostok”. The borders of post-Soviet Central Asia with China, Afghanistan, and Iran were then seen by Moscow as some kind of barriers under its responsibility separating Southeast Asia and the Middle East from Europe that “is now stretched from Lisbon to Vladivostok” and “a common security space from Vancouver to Vladivostok”. Things are quite different now. They, according to J.J. Mearsheimer, an American political scientist, and international relations scholar, are now as follows: while “Russia should be our ally to contain China, we [Americans] have pushed the Russians into the arms of the Chinese”.
In such a situation, Russian political thought and strategists are already considering the possibilities of dividing Central Asia, in particular Kazakhstan, into two major spheres: Northern Kazakhstan, along with Central, and Western Kazakhstan, which would be influenced or even annexed by Russia (“maybe even with the preservation of the state of Kazakhstan on the political map of the world”), and Southern and South Eastern Kazakhstan, which would be influenced and, maybe, annexed by China.
Back in 2009, The Russian Komsomolskaya Pravda's Darya Aslamova quoted Alexander Penkov, a security expert of the People's Diplomacy Foundation in Russia as saying: “The question for us is not whether the Chinese will come to Kazakhstan. The question is when they will come. And that day is not far off. I'm not talking about economic expansion, I'm talking about a direct military threat”. While answering the question, “A few years ago there were rumors that China and Russia could make a deal and divide Kazakhstan. Do you believe that is possible?”, Alexander Penkov said: “Everything is possible”.
Now it's 2024. Сould China and Russia be considering a deal on dividing Kazakhstan? There is no answer to this question. But what is noteworthy in this connection is that, according to Kazakh sources and sinologists, the Chinese media and textbooks say that the area of Lake Balkhash is the Western region of China, e.i. the Chinese side kind of lays claim to the territory of Kazakhstan east of Lake Balkhash, or, in other words, up to Lake Balkhash, whereas some Russian MPs and political experts are talking about annexing almost the whole rest of the Kazakhstani territory that lies north and west of Lake Balkhash. If there are no such discussions between the Russians and the Chinese [yet], where did such Chinese-Russian coherence in claiming territories in Kazakhstan come from?
Of course, it's hard to expect Russia and China to arrive at a total convergence of viewpoints on the different options for the development of the situation in Central Asia, including Kazakhstan. But they, as far as can be judged, always present a united front in opposing the possibility of NATO having its stronghold in Central Asia and the possibility of the post-Soviet Central Asian region merging with the volatile greater Middle East. But as of now, nobody knows how things will turn out in the Asian part of the CIS.
Back in February 2008, Aleksander Sokurov, one of Russia's best-known film directors and social and political figures, said: “What awaits us [Russia] is the most difficult, in my opinion, war with Ukraine and, perhaps, the most difficult conflict with Kazakhstan. And here, I am not [yet] talking about China's expansion - this is a quasi-hard problem”. His prediction about the war with Ukraine was confirmed 14 years later, in February 2022. In an interview, he gave to Nikolai Solodovnikov, a popular Russian journalist and video blogger, shortly after the beginning of the Russian campaign against the Ukrainian state in February 2022, Alexander Sokurov while answering the question “Can you go back to the speech of the year 2007 [2008] for a moment? You then were talking, among other things, about a possible heavy confrontation with Kazakhstan. Do you still feel it that way today?”, said: “Of course, I do, because the issues regarding ethnic issues have not been resolved. There's something else, I would rather not say it in public, as I could be completely wrong. Well, yes, a tough situation may arise in there. There won't be any possibility to cover up the front in that direction. If the front in the Ukrainian direction may somehow be covered up, then that front [in the Kazakh direction] can't be covered up. There may be too great forces going to clash there. There may be too great forces going to clash there with which my country [Russia] wouldn't cope. It [Russia] wouldn't cope. You see, we [Russians] don't match our ambitions”.
In the above-mentioned claims by Alexander Sokurov, there seem to be echoes of the geo-strategic ideas long circulating in the Russian political environment and, in this case, refracted by the prism of the famous director's perception. One audience member commented on the Russian director's interview with Nikolai Solodovnikov as follows: “I think Alexander Sokurov talked a lot to Yeltsin in the 1990s. And the plan to attack Ukraine and Kazakhstan arose before Putin”. But for what it's worth, the Russian director's predictions, as time has shown, are tending to play out. Those monitoring developments in the post-Soviet area, including those in the triangle Ukraine - Russia - Kazakhstan would have to admit, whether they like it or not, that events are developing according to the scenario predicted by Alexander Sokurov back in 2008. Russia now is in the third year of war with Ukraine. This war is “unlikely to end anytime soon”. Meanwhile, the Russian media are just now posting reports that Russian Defense Minister Belousov ‘has put the issue bluntly’ to Astana - Kazakhstan is warned ‘ahead of a decisive fight’.
Given the above, one would think Sokurov’s visionary gift should have drawn great respect to his personality from the Russian political and expert community. But in reality, this doesn't happen. Moreover, Alexander Sokurov has fallen into disfavor with the Russian ruling regime, and the pro-Kremlin Russian media have criticized and continue to criticize his point of view on all this. And here is what Absatz.media wrote on this subject: “Sokurov enjoyed communicating with the head of State, who had been generously funding his exercises in directing and teaching. Probably, in gratitude for such attention to him, Alexander Nikolaevich [Sokurov] has gone completely nuts. Sorry, but it’s difficult to describe Sokurov’s words otherwise… The end of Sokurov’s career had already arrived when he ceased to be a director and donned the amusing rags of a prophet. When he didn’t [properly] appreciate the attention to him as an artist and wanted [much] more”.
In the context of the above, one can assume that Alexander Sokurov, who has proved to be able to anticipate what the Kremlin strategists and rulers were about to do or not to do about Russia's neighbors, can be seen by official Moscow as ‘the person causing trouble’. On the other hand, one cannot help but pay attention to the fact that Russian politicians, willingly or unwillingly, followed and continue following the advice given by the Russian director in his February 2008 interview on the subject of a future war with Ukraine and a possible conflict with Kazakhstan. Alexander Sokurov at that time said: “Unresolved issues in the soft underbelly of Russia, i.e. the regions along the southern perimeter of the Russian Federation pose a huge threat to our State [Russia] and our lives. A collapse can happen at any moment unless there is a colossal strategic effort by intellectuals and statesmen to forestall such a development. We must not lag, Russia must not lag. We only need to act proactively in terms of politics. Russia does not have a geo-policy. Geopolitics in Russia means the country's domestic policies”.
Since the early 2010s, Moscow, as far as it can be judged, has been working in advance both in the Ukrainian direction and the Kazakhstani direction. The way how all this was done and is being done by the Russian side in the Ukrainian case is now known all over the world. What isn't commonly known is how similar things were done and are being done in the Kazakhstani case. Perhaps this can be explained by the fact that the politics of Kazakhstan have their peculiar specifics which are by default the most important factors in the internal political life of the State, and which, however, are almost not spoken of publicly both in Kazakhstan and Russia when talking about the Kazakh political situation. What are those specifics like?
Let us listen to what Fedor Razzakov, a Russian writer, historian, and journalist, has to say in this connection: “In the 1920s, the People's Commissariat of Nationalities, and then the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, developed a strategy for managing national [ethnic] elites, including through taking into account clan rivalry, which existed in all union republics long before the creation of the Soviet Union. The Bolsheviks were required not to aggravate that rivalry, but to use it for their purposes... The strategy (of Moscow) was as follows: representatives of [three] different [political] clans were appointed to the 3 highest posts in a particular union republic... Thus, power in the union republics was divided between various [political] clans, thereby they had equal shares in it... [In almost all the union republics of the USSR, these were normally the regional political clans competing for power]. [But] in Kazakhstan, for example, power was shared by three [tribal] clans which represented the Senior, the Middle, and the Junior zhuzes, [i.e. by the representatives of three tribal groups of which the Kazakh people are composed]”.
Hence the peculiar specifics that represent by default the most important factors in the internal political life of Kazakhstan.Here is a bit more background. Kazakhs are traditionally considered to fall into three separate parts known as “Zhuzes”. These are from east to west, the Senior Zhuz, in present-day southeastern Kazakhstan north of the Tien Shan; the Middle Zhuz, in the central steppe region east of the Aral Sea; and the Junior Zhuz, between the Aral Sea and the Volga River. In short (for ease of understanding), one can say this: usually the term ‘Senior Zhuz’ refers to southern Kazakhs and their native territory, Southern Kazakhstan (where most of the country's uranium fields lie); the term ‘Middle Zhuz’ refers to northern and eastern Kazakhs, and their native territory, Northern and Eastern Kazakhstan, or generally to northern Kazakhs and Northern Kazakhstan (where almost all of the country's deposits of rare metals lie); the term ‘Junior Zhuz’ refers to western Kazakhs and their native territory, Western Kazakhstan (where practically all of Kazakhstan's oil and gas deposits are).
Thus, it turns out that there are three groups of ethnic Kazakhs, each having historically existed and still existing today with the distinct knowledge of their home territory, origin, and identity. The differences between them cannot be just merely determined as the regional ones. Because even, say, the Junior Zhuz members who have been deeply rooted in the Senior, or Middle Zhuz community in Southern, or Northern Kazakhstan for generations, are usually seen and accepted by their surroundings as they are by Zhuz origin. This is the norm in the country. The Kazakhs, regardless of who they are or where they live or work, can easily identify where in Kazakhstan someone of Kazakh descent comes from. In a word, the differences between three separate groups of Kazakhs seem to be more similar to ethnic differences, or perhaps even more than that. Let's try to understand the latter with the following comparative examples.
It is no problem for Russian President Putin to appoint someone to a senior position in a region whoever he is and wherever it is. Thus, in 2006, he appointed Efrem Romanov, a member of the Yakut people, a Far-Eastern Asian ethnicity of less than 500,000 people, as Head of the Police Department in Orenburg province, a region of almost 2 mln people, in which the ethnic Russians and other Europeans are the absolute majority. The latter worked there for eight years (2006-2014) and had no problems with the local authorities and people, even though those of non-European (non-Caucasian) descent are believed to be not very much welcomed as senior officials in the Russian provinces with predominantly ethnic Russian (European) populations like the Orenburg one.
It is quite another thing in Kazakhstan. Zonakz.net, in a piece entitled “It is easier for a native of China to lead the Kyzylorda region than for a local Alshyn”, said: “In January 1993, Nazhmeden Iskaliev, a representative of the Junior Zhuz, was appointed by the Kazakh President as Head of the Kokshetau Province Administration, i.e. he received an appointment to the Middle Zhuz. But he didn't remain in office for a long time. In November of the same year, he was forced to leave office.
Immediately after his appointment, the regional prosecutor had brought a case against him and prosecuted it until he left. The situation looked as if the Middle Zhuz members in Kokshetau were all out to get the Junior Zhuz representative out of their province. Such, probably, it was”.
In many other [post-]Soviet nations, power struggles among the political elite groups, or clans hardly affect most common people. It is an entirely different matter in the case of Kazakhstan. Here is what the French newspaper Le Figaro's François Hauter wrote in this regard: “For all Kazakhs, political life boils down exclusively to the internal struggles of hordes [Zhuzes] and tribes” (François HAUTER ‘Guerre de clan dans les steppes kazakhes’, mardi 21 septembre 2004, page 4). Hence the conclusion suggests the way power struggles have turned out and are turning out, one way or another, affects every ethnic Kazakh.
A well-known Kazakh proverb says, “One person's ascending to the throne means that 40 persons, belonging to his tribal community, will establish themselves near the top of power”. Over the last three-plus decades, i.e. since the moment Moscow stopped directly maintaining the arrangement where “representatives of [three] different [political] clans were being appointed to the 3 highest posts in a particular union republic”, there hasn't been anything in Kazakhstan that would have proved it (the above proverb) wrong.
There's the proof of that. As Sally Nikoline Cummings concluded in her study “The Political Elite in Kazakhstan Since Independence (1991–1998): Origins, Structure and Policies”, the Kazakh pyramid of power had the following form in the late twentieth century: “Approximately 40% of members of the 1995 political elite appeared to be from the Senior Horde [Zhuz], 28% from the Middle and 9% from the Junior”. In 2020, 22 years after the publication of the above study by Sally Nikoline Cummings, Ia-centr.ru, the website of Moscow State University’s IAC (Information and Analytical Center), reported, citing a Kazakhstani expert, the following: “50% of members of the [2020] political elite [in Kazakhstan] are from the Senior Zhuz, 10% from the Shaprashty clan [to which the first Kazakh President, Nursultan Nazarbayev, belongs] of the Senior zhuz. In terms of the Zhuzes' and tribes' representation in the Kazakhstani system of power, there is a significant bias in favor of southern Kazakhs… Overcoming tribal imbalances is one of the most important tasks for Tokayev, otherwise, he will not be able to gain the support of all the regional elite groups in Kazakhstan… [But] it cannot be said [that with the advent of a new president], old customs and traditions are becoming a thing of the past. There's room for them within the [existing] formula. Some political rules and traditions depend little on presidents; they are, so to speak, part of the mentality or cultural code”.
Such are realities of social and political life in today's Kazakhstan. And they have deep roots in the Kazakh society. Testimony of this is what the Kazakh ex-Deputy-Prime Minister, Galym Abilsiitov, once said,‘in Kazakhstan, the only form of the division [of society] that runs through force fields are the Zhuzes; only on this basis - the fact of belonging to one or another Zhuz - people identify each other’.
There can be no doubt that Moscow has long monitored this situation closely to turn it to its advantage when the time comes. And this practice seemingly hasn't been and isn't limited to just monitoring. It's unlikely those observers, who are following attentively the latest developments in relations between Moscow and Astana, have lost sight of the fact that shortly before the start of the war in Ukraine, some Russian media began playing the card of the need for ‘protecting… the Kazakhs from the Middle Zhuz, who are historically and mentally close to us [Russians]’, in contrast to ‘the southern Kazakhs’, and, most importantly, of the ‘deprivation’ of the potentially very rich, but actually ‘poverty-stricken West’(the Junior Zhuz) in the face of the Senior (Southern) Zhuz elites’ domination in the country as a whole.
The West and especially China most certainly are following the conversations about the likelihood of the collapse of Kazakhstan and the possibility of the emergence of several states on its territory, that have been going on since last year on Russian TV channels and websites.
All of this is far from being harmless, the more so in the current situation where Kazakhstan is again considering the option of building an Atyrau (Eskene) - Kuryk (a port located on the east coast of the Caspian Sea, south of the port of Aktau in Mangystau province) oil pipeline and of laying a pipeline through the Caspian Sea to Baku. Initially, the implementation of this project (Kazakhstan Caspian Transportation System, or KCTS) was supposed to be carried out in 2010-2012. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan agreed on the creation of the Kazakhstan Caspian Oil Transportation System back in 2006. In 2008, in Baku, the national oil companies of these two countries - KazMunaiGas and SOCAR - signed a KCTS agreement. In 2009, Kazakh representatives stated that “the construction of the KCTS would be an effective large-scale solution for the export of Kashagan crude oil from the Agip KCO integrated oil and gas processing facility in the Eskene area [near the city of Atyrau] to the Turkish port of Ceyhan in the Mediterranean Sea through the Baku – Tbilisi - Ceyhan (BTC) transport system”. It was reported that “the capacity of the oil pipeline would be 56 million tons of oil per year”. If this project were implemented, Kazakhstan would be able to practically stop being dependent on the CPC and other transit pipelines through Russia. It is unlikely that Moscow would have been pleased by the prospects of this project. Then what happened next?
In 2011, there were protests in Zhanaozen, a city in Mangystau province located less than 100 km away from the port of Kuryk, “at a scale not seen before in Kazakhstan’s modern history”. And then, on December 16, 2011, what Wikipedia considers was the ‘Zhanaozen massacre’ happened. A little over a year later, on February 28, 2013, Lenta.ru, a Russian media outlet, published an article entitled “The Junior Zhuz: Will a new State appear on the shores of the Caspian Sea?”. It said: “[Russian] experts constantly draw attention to the main strategic prerequisite for the crisis in Mangistau - the desire of a certain part of Western Kazakhstan elites to secede from Astana, seeking to get an autonomy status, or even to go so far as to proclaim an independent State on the shores of the Caspian Sea”.
The project of the Kazakhstan Caspian Oil Transportation System (KCTS), as far as can be judged, was then put on the shelf.
“The Junior Zhuz: Will a new State appear on the shores of the Caspian Sea?” was a long article written with great knowledge of the matter. Before the time when it was published, no one had ever said publicly anything like that to the Kazakh audience. The piece had an explosive effect on the widest circles of the Kazakh public, particularly since it had been published by Lenta.ru, a Moscovite media outlet that took 5th place in terms of traffic among European news sites in all languages in 2013. There is an explanation for this. Here is what Lenta.ru told its readers in this regard: “Kazakhstan absolutely does not control more than half of the television network and almost the entire book market, not to mention the Internet. The information environment [in the Central Asian country] now is quite friendly to the authorities of Kazakhstan solely thanks to the support of Moscow, which protects the republican elites”. If the above is to be believed, it turns out that in terms of information security, the authorities of Kazakhstan depends entirely on ‘the support of Moscow, which protects the republican elites’.
Abai.kz, a popular Kazakhstani media outlet, said as follows about the Lenta.ru piece: “In the said article,... the political technology style of specialized institutions, perhaps even special services, can be traced. Is that it?”. Aidos Sarym, a Kazakh political expert, who is said to be a member of the Berish tribe of the Junior Zhuz, answered the question. He said: “Certainly. It would be naive to believe that the publication of Peter Bologov’s article was merely an accidental one”.
Aidos Sarym then began to prove that “Western [Kazakh] separatism” is utter nonsense.
It's been ten-plus years since then. There is renewed talk of implementing the KCTS project.
Aidos Sarym is currently a Member of the country's Parliament. Recently he told the Kazakh press that Russia had declared him persona non grata to 2070. He added: “I have a notification from the FSB that if I cross the border I may face criminal prosecution for up to seven years! Likewise in Belarus... And no one explained anything”.
So, what's actually going on in the triangle Moscow-Astana-Beijing? That's the question.