The Hijrah Phenomenon: Shifting Urban Muslim Identities In Indonesia – Analysis

By Najwa Abdullah

Public expressions of religious identity have been defining Indonesia’s urban landscape over the past decade. The ‘Hijrah’ phenomenon is central to this shift from a secular to a more religiously devout lifestyle. Driven by a youthful following and supported by influential public figures, Hijrah and its associated movements have evolved alongside Indonesia’s changing political landscape and governments, steadily gaining traction in cities like Jakarta, Bandung, and Surabaya since the late 1990s.[1]

In many cases, embarking on Hijrah entails adopting more conservative Islamic teachings and integrating them into consumption habits, social interactions, and media practices. This process is often marked by changes in attire, behaviour, and attitudes toward the opposite gender. Such a shift is therefore not only spiritual but also cultural, as it redefines an individual’s identity and engagement with society.

Over the past 15 years, the Hijrah trend has given rise to online communities with a significant following. Such communities actively promote the movement through social media posts, podcasts, kajian (study groups), and offline gatherings (see table below).

Drawing secondary data from scholarly literature and materials from newsletters and policy reports, this paper takes a closer look at the Hijrah phenomenon and identifies the key factors that contribute to its appeal. Considering its sustained popularity and ongoing public debate, it is contended that the Hijrah trend is likely to persist and even extend beyond the traditional urban centres. However, as further explained in the next sections, it will face growing challenges from within Muslim communities, including from within government and mainstream Islamic organisations such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU).

HIJRAH AS AN URBAN PHENOMENON

The Arabic term hijrah,[8] meaning “migration”, etymologically refers to any form of migration. However, it holds special significance in the Islamic tradition,[9] as it marks the historic migration of Prophet Muhammad from Mecca to Medina in the 7^th century.[10] It thus symbolises both a physical journey and a spiritual quest for conditions conducive to the growth of the Islamic faith.[11]

Since the 2000s, the term has been revived in Indonesian popular discourse and appropriated by the Islamic revivalist movement to signify a newfound piety and religious identity. With emphasis on repentance, purification, and self-reform,[12] the Hijrah phenomenon can be viewed as a form of ‘born-again’ religiosity,[13] or in a local term, ‘santrinisasi’,[14] in which a Muslim individual undergoes a personal transformation of abandoning perceived sinful lifestyles and embracing a more devout path.[15] As such, the Hijrah movement saw the rise of Quran recitation groups, widespread adoption of Muslim clothing such as the hijab (veil), and a significant increase in interest in Hajj and Umrah pilgrimages.[16] In this context, a 2021 study by PPIM UIN Jakarta[17] suggests that the Hijrah movement was perceived positively by a large share of the online audience for its focus on self-improvement grounded in Islamic principles. At the same time, the Hijrah trend often reinforces conservative norms and values[18] and therefore can be seen as part of the overall rise of conservative Islam in post-Reform Indonesia.

However, it lacks a clear and unified institutional foundation.[19] It is argued that Hijrah followers embody what Indonesian scholar Kuntowijoyo describes as ‘Muslims Without Mosques’.[20] Unlike traditional santri, who gain Islamic knowledge through long-established institutions like pesantren or madrasa, Hijrah followers derive their understanding from non-traditional sources such as popular books, magazines, radio, television, and the Internet. Primarily founded by public figures and self-taught preachers, they deliver Islamic dakwah (proselytisation) through novel methods, such as engaging hobby-based groups, utilising social media, collaborating with influencers, and offering services like youth counselling and matchmaking. They produce creative content like novels, songs, films, and fashion to present Islam as being compatible with consumer culture and urban lifestyles, addressing themes related to love, marriage, and career.[21]

A case in point is the emergence of ‘cadari novels’, a genre of religiously oriented romance that prominently features face-veiling Muslim women in both its narratives and imagery.[22] Notably, the meteoric success of Ayat-Ayat Cinta in 2008, both as a novel with over 1 million copies sold[23] and as a film with 3.8 million viewers, brought widespread attention to this genre. Featuring a pious young Muslim man and a face-veiled Muslim woman as protagonists, the story portrays polygamy as a sanctioned Islamic practice and advocates for ta’aruf (Islam-compliant courtship). Another example is the proliferation of self-help books encouraging Muslim women to adopt the headscarf and practice ta’aruf as a means to self-reform and in order to distance themselves from sinful practices. This includes Yuk Berhijab! (Let’s Wear the Hijab!, 2013) and Udah, Putusin Aja! (Just Break-Up Already, 2015) by Felix Siauw, a self-taught preacher known for his pro-caliphate stance.[24]

Beyond media engagement, offline networks and physical presence have been equally crucial to the success and sustainability of Hijrah’s community-building efforts.[25] With support from both the government[26] and commercial enterprises, Hijrah communities are claiming public spaces such as malls, city squares, and streets. In Bandung, for instance, they collaborated with the biker community to organise a convoy after tarawih prayers.[27] In Jakarta, the celebrity-led Hijrah group Kajian Musawarah launched HijrahFest in 2018. Held annually in exhibition halls—including the prestigious Jakarta Convention Centre and Balai Kartini—and featuring halal bazaars, sermons and talk shows, the event has established itself as a prominent platform for actors associated with Hijrah and their followers. Attended by prominent figures such as former Jakarta governor, Anies Baswedan, HijrahFest reportedly attracted 25,000 visitors from Jakarta and its surrounding suburbs, generating over 25 billion rupiahs in monetary circulation.[28] The success of HijrahFest captures the effervescence of urban Muslims for a blend of activities: exploring exhibitions, purchasing halal products, and attending religious talksdelivered by prominent preachers.[29] Since its launch, the festival has expanded beyond the capital, introducing regional editions and smaller-scale workshops in cities such as Bandung, Bandar Lampung, Pekanbaru, Padang, Medan, Palu, and Makassar.

FROM BEING SUBCULTURE TO BEING MAINSTREAM

The Hijrah trend represents the culmination of a protracted cultural negotiation, adaptation, and transformation process.[30] Many scholars have linked its emergence to the growing influence of Salafism—a purist form of Islam—in the region.[31] More importantly, however, its origins can also be traced back to the broader ethos of adopting an Islamic way of life, which gained momentum in Indonesia during the 1980s alongside the rise of global Islamic revivalism. This period witnessed the emergence of the Jemaah Tarbiyah (JT) movement, which laid the ideological and practical foundations for many of the values and practices later popularised under the Hijrah banner. Drawing inspiration from Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, JT championed the concept of “Islam kaffah”, which means a comprehensive application of Islamic principles in every facet of life. It directed its reformist efforts towards two primary goals: nurturing the spiritual development of existing Muslims and reshaping the formal political system to be based on Islamic principles.[32] Anchored in religious education and dakwah, the movement expanded primarily through small, structured study circles (halaqah or liqo), particularly within secular universities[33] and schools,[34] thus manifesting as Islam-oriented subcultural groups. After years of repression under the Suharto regime, the movement developed new strategies of Islamic preaching to expand its influence in the public sphere,[35] leveraging not only mainstream politics but also popular and online platforms.[36]

Notably, the adoption of the movement’s ideas by Indonesia’s celebrity circles played a significant role in enabling them to transcend their subcultural confines and gradually permeate the broader social mainstream. To a great extent, this mainstreaming was enabled by musicians and actors who became actively involved in dakwah across the 2000s and 2010s, such as (late) Gitto Rollies, Sakti—ex-guitarist of the band Sheila on 7— (late) Jefri Al Buchori, Teuku Wisnu, and Arie Untung. It also includes their female counterparts who embraced the hijab such as Inneke Koesherawati, Shireen Sungkar, Dewi Sandra, and Laudya Chintya Bella. Using various platforms such as television shows, popular writing, and social media, these figures popularised the term ‘Hijrah’ to describe their newfound piety, thereby modelling a journey of religious transformation that resonates with broader young audiences and their desires for self-expression.[37]

As an extension of Islamic revivalism, Hijrah followers largely draw on the literalist interpretations prevalent in both Salafism[38] and Islamism,[39] especially on matters regarding women, leadership, and perceptions of non-Muslims. These interpretations contribute to Hijrah’s conservative tendencies. For instance, the same study by PPIM UIN Jakarta found that certain factions within the Hijrah movement, such as the apolitical Salafists tend to support polygamy and restrict women’s mobility.[40] Broadly speaking, in the context of modern Indonesia, the practice of polygamy remains relatively uncommon and is largely negatively viewed.[41] Nonetheless, the recent upward trend in polygamous practices within certain circles—including the tarbiyah-linked Muslim elite circle[42]—has raised concerns among Indonesian Muslim women. Other groups such as Pemuda Hijrah, while more accommodating of modern lifestyle pursuits, encourage early marriage[43] through practices such as ta’aruf[44]and online campaigns such as #IndonesiaTanpaPacaran (Indonesia Without Dating).[45] Moreover, related events such as HijrahFest often invite controversial figures to perform, such as Abdul Somad, a provocative preacher known for making inflammatory remarks about Christianity,[46] and Felix Siauw, who has been linked to the now-banned Islamist organisation, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI).[47]

Despite the occasional involvement of certain preachers, Hijrah adherents do not necessarily oppose Pancasila or the Indonesian state, nor do they advocate for a caliphate. However, they tend to adopt a globally oriented perspective, often identifying with the concept of a global ummah (Muslim community).[48] As previously mentioned, their Islamic references are diverse, drawing from sources such as Salafi teachings that tend to promote a narrow interpretation of Islam, often characterised by anti-pluralist views that dichotomise the world into Muslim and non-Muslim.[49] The Hijrah movement is thus seen as deviating from the mainstream perspectives of NU and Muhammadiyah. Increasingly, figures within the Indonesian government are raising these concerns. For example, Kamaruddin Amin, Director General of Islamic Community Guidance at the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA), has stated that Hijrah’s brand of conservatism “is not suitable for Islam in the Indonesian context”.[50] In response, MORA boosted its religious moderation campaign in 2019 to challenge the movement’s growing influence.[51] As discussed in the next section, certain initiatives such as the HijrahFest subsequently adjusted their strategies to re-align with the broader societal narratives while simultaneously reinforcing its underlying exclusive Islamic orientation.

FROM LIFESTYLE TO INDUSTRY

Hijrah proponents represent a relatively small yet steadily expanding segment of Indonesian society, with their influence gradually extending beyond lifestyle choices into industries. In a 2019 survey done of 2,192 Indonesians aged 20-35 years old across 28 provinces in Indonesia by an independent fact-tank IDN Research Institute, 72.8% of the respondents claimed that they were in the process of doing ‘Hijrah’. Notably, this shift was done by making changes in physical appearance, such as wearing the hijab or growing a beard (24%), and increasing consumption of religious content on social media (21%).

As such, online Hijrah communities such as Yuk Ngaji, often develop alongside businesses like Umrah travel agencies and online hijab stores. A notable example is Felix Siauw, whose religious activism and popular writing are complemented by his establishment of HijabAlila, an online hijab shop that promotes syariah-compliant hijabs, characterised by their long and loose design. Recently, he assumed the role of a spiritual guide for Umrah and Hajjprogrammes, as well as other religious tourism packages[52] organised by Hijrah groups such as Terang Jakarta. Equally important is the steady growth of hijab advocacy groups and fashion communities, including Peduli Jilbab (Care about Headscarves), Ukhti Sally, and the Hijabers Community, which encourage their followers to not only do hijrah, but also engage in halal businesses.[53]

To some extent, this growing trend is reflected in the economic data. For instance, Indonesia’s Umrah and Hajj ecosystem is anticipated to see substantial growth, with economic turnover projected to rise from Rp 65 trillion ($4 billion) in 2023 to Rp 194 trillion by 2030 — an almost threefold increase. This surge is driven not only by Indonesia’s expanding halal industry but also the Saudi government’s Vision 2030 reforms.[54] Furthermore, according to a 2022 report by the World Economic Forum, 91 trillion rupiahs (approximately US$6.07 billion) were spent annually on more than 1 billion units of hijab,[55] underscoring the widespread adoption of veiling by Indonesian Muslim women. Moreover, the Indonesian government increasingly capitalises on this development by pushing its further integration into the halal industry ecosystem. For example, the Halal Product Assurance Organising Agency (BPJPH) under Indonesia’s Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) aims to expand halal certification requirements to consumer goods, including clothing, by October 2026. Additionally, the government has established the Indonesia Global Halal Fashion (IGHF) initiative to position Indonesia as a dominant player in the global Islamic fashion market.[56]

Furthermore, the Hijrah movement’s growing economic influence has not only facilitated its expansion beyond traditional urban centres into more provinces but also led to increasingly fluid and ambivalent narratives. HijrahFest, bolstered by support from local authorities, strategically brands itself around “pemberdayaan ekonomi masyarakat” (community economic empowerment).[57] This framing broadens participation and aligns the festival with government initiatives aimed at promoting community welfare. At the same time, the use of terms like ‘Hijrahpreneur’[58] highlights the movement’s distinctively religious orientation. This duality suggests an attempt to integrate into mainstream development narratives while preserving the exclusive Hijrah-oriented worldview.

BACKLASH AND COUNTER-NARRATIVES

The rise of new ustad and preachers in celebrity circles or secular backgrounds has further fuelled debates over the continuity of traditionalist religious authority in Indonesia.[59] In some cases, this contestation has led to tensions within the Muslim community, with events featuring Hijrah ustad occasionally facing a backlash.[60]

This contention is particularly pronounced in the cancellation of the 2022 HijrahFest in Surabaya, East Java—a stronghold of NU—following criticism from NU and the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) on the improper use of their logos for commercial purposes. This controversy was further fuelled by concerns over the ideological leanings of some groups associated with HijrahFest, which were perceived as undermining the principles of NKRI (the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia) and Pancasila.[61] In this context, Hanan Attaki, a prominent Hijrah preacher who founded Pemuda Hijrah, was banned by the MUI East Java branch from delivering sermons in certain areas. His ‘gaul’ (trendy) preaching style and alleged ties to HTI were seen to be incompatible with the pesantren culture and to be a potential disruption to its order.[62] Interestingly, Attaki later sought to rebuild his ties with NU, leading to his pledge of allegiance to the organisation in 2023. This move caused a stir among Muslim netizens. Some particularly criticised NU for exhibiting “ashabiyah” or “ta’ashshub”, terms that describe a tribalistic or overly factional mindset.[63] Though it is too early to assess the full implications of Attaki’s ideological shift, this development highlights the increasing complexity of religious allegiances and the potential for further shifts in ideological orientations within Indonesian Islam.

Furthermore, resistance to Hijrah narratives arises not only from established institutions but also through grassroots and individual initiatives. Notable examples are online-based literary movements like Gerakan Islam Cinta (Love Islam Movement) and Relax It’s Just Religion!, as well as Islamic news portals such as the pesantren-based mubadalah.id and Islami.co. advocating for more inclusive interpretations of Islam. While their social media followings remain comparatively modest, typically under 50,000, their institutional backing — such as support from media companies like Mizan for Gerakan Islam Cinta and alliances with activist and artistic circles for Relax It’s Just Religion! — help sustain these movements and extend their reach to a wider audience over time. A new generation of religious influencers and activists has also emerged to champion tolerance and egalitarianism within the faith. This includes Habib Hussein Ja’far, a traditionalist preacher who has amassed 6 million followers on Instagram, who is known for his moderate views and for spreading his Islamic messages through comedy.[64]

Another example is Kalis Mardiasih, an NU activist known for her criticism of conservative positions on issues concerning women through her books Muslimah yang Diperdebatkan (Muslim Women Who Are Debated, 2019) and Hijrah Jangan Jauh-Jauh, Nanti Nyasar! (Don’t Hijrah Too Far, You’ll Get Lost!, 2019), which have been reprinted multiple times.[65] Her writings critically highlight the paradox of conservative Islam’s embrace of modern trends, which, despite appearing accommodating and fashionable, often impose restrictive norms on women. To this extent, she argues that contemporary dakwah content often distorts the lived experiences of Muslim women by glorifying domestic roles, promoting early marriage, and reinforcing their subordinate position relative to men.[66]

The slow yet growing popularity of these counter-narratives signals a potential shift that could challenge conservative dominance in the near future: they could transcend organisational boundaries to resonate with broader segments of Indonesian society and achieve long-term societal impact.

CONCLUSION

The Hijrah phenomenon represents a new phase in the broader conflict between socially liberal and conservative camps, as well as between traditionalist and reformist Muslim groups. The movement’s current success is largely due to its ability to adapt to urban environments, leverage digital platforms, and align with market forces. However, its continued expansion is likely to face more challenges, including resistance from established religious authorities and emerging counter-narratives within the Muslim community. These dynamics not only point to an evolving and contested future for conservative Islam but also underscore deepening factionalism and ideological contestation. More importantly, this also highlights the urgent need to foster cohesive urban identities in Indonesia in ways that can mitigate these tensions.

For endnotes, please refer to the original pdf document.

• About the author: Najwa Abdullah is Visiting Fellow with the Regional Social & Cultural Studies Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. Her research interests include media and communications, popular culture, cultural policy, postcolonial thought, and contemporary Islam.
• Source: This article was published by ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute